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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 981499-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1991). This Court has 
jurisdiction of the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court correct in finding that the initial stop of defendant's car 
was supported by reasonable suspicion that a criminal violation had occurred, based 
upon the officer's observation that the car had no license plates displayed? 
2. Was the trial court correct in finding that the officer's inspection of 
defendant's lease agreement, as a result of defendant's voluntary offer, provided 
reasonable cause to detain defendant for further investigation? 
3. Was the trial court correct in finding that the officer had reasonable grounds 
to search the passenger compartment based upon a reasonable concern for his safety, or 
in the alternative, was the search of the passenger compartment proper as incident to 
defendant's arrest for driving without a valid license? 
4. Was the trial court correct in finding that the officer had probable cause to 
search defendant's trunk, based upon the officer's detection of the odor of marijuana 
and coffee in the passenger compartment of defendant's car? 
With respect to all of these issues, the trial court's factual findings in support of 
its ruling on a motion to suppress are reviewed under the "deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 
909 (Utah 1996). The trial court's legal conclusions are "reviewed for correctness, 
with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard 
to the facts." Id., citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) 
with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8 (1998), and with failure to pay drug stamp tax, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-106 (1989) (R.l). 
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a warrantless 
vehicle search (R.42-43). Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion was denied 
(R.92-98).l Defendant then entered a conditional no contest plea to the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, reserving the right to 
appeal the court's denial of his motion to suppress (R.l 14). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to 0-5 years in prison, with the sentence 
stayed pending completion of 36 months probation, including one year in Grand County 
Jail (R.l35). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 6, 1997, Trooper Richard Haycock of the Utah Highway Patrol was 
on duty alongside highway 1-70 in southern Utah, when defendant drove by (R. 147:4). 
Haycock noted that defendant's car did not have any license plates displayed, and 
1
 The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress is reproduced 
in Addendum A. The trial court's memorandum decision denying this motion is 
reproduced in Addendum B. 
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Haycock accordingly pulled defendant over to investigate. After stopping his car, 
defendant immediately exited the vehicle, walked back toward Haycock, and asked why 
Haycock had pulled him over (R. 147:4-5). 
Haycock explained that defendant had been stopped because there was no 
registration on the car. Defendant responded that the car was a rental, and that there 
should be some registration on it somewhere. As Haycock moved up along the side of 
defendant's car, he saw "what [he] thought might be a temporary sticker pasted in the 
back window" (R. 147:5). Upon closer inspection, Haycock saw that the sticker was a 
valid 90-day temporary registration from the state of Arizona. This sticker was not 
visible to Haycock prior to stopping defendant, due to the rear window defroster wires 
and the dark tint and sloping angle of the rear window (R. 147:47). 
At that point, Haycock was ready to leave, the entire encounter taking about 30 
seconds (R. 147:6). However, as Haycock turned to leave, defendant asked Haycock if 
he wanted to look at the lease agreement for the car. Defendant appeared frightened 
for some reason, making Haycock suspicious that something was going on (R. 147:21-
22). Haycock then accepted defendant's offer to look at the lease agreement, saying, 
"[s]ure, I'd like to see that, if you don't mind" (R. 147:6). 
Defendant retrieved the lease agreement from his car, and as he handed it to 
Haycock, told him that the car had been rented by Dr. Dean Allen. Without being 
questioned by the officer, defendant also volunteered that he had a family medical 
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emergency in Denver, Colorado and that he was in a hurry to get there. Haycock read 
in the lease agreement that the car had been rented by Dean Porter, not Dean Allen, in 
Tucson, Arizona, and that there were no additional drivers listed in the agreement as 
being allowed to drive the car (R. 147:7-8, 27). Haycock then questioned defendant 
regarding the identity of the person who rented the car. Defendant insisted it was Dean 
Allen. Defendant then offered to show Haycock his driver's license, and Haycock 
responded that "Yeah, I want to see your driver's license" (R. 147:27-29). At that 
point, defendant was becoming more and more nervous, to the extent that he was 
"stuttering and stammering and having a hard time controlling himself" (R. 147:8). 
Defendant tried to explain to Haycock something about his license, but "it was more 
just gibberish, just stuttering" (R. 147:7). 
Defendant got into his car to look for his license, and then backed out, asking 
the officer if he could put on some shoes. It was a hot day, and Haycock replied 
"Yeah, you can put some shoes on. It's probably burning your feet." Defendant then 
put on one shoe and continued searching for his license. Haycock said, "Well, maybe 
you ought to stop for a second here and put your other shoe on." Defendant then put 
on his other shoe (R. 147:8). During this time, defendant was becoming increasingly 
and unusually nervous, making Haycock fear for his safety. Haycock made several 
observations at this point, including the fact that there was a Colorado road map open 
in the front seat, and that the ignition key in this rental car was on a ring with a lot of 
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other keys and advertisements. Further, defendant's luggage was in the back seat of 
the car, and Haycock saw a Days Inn envelope and a Las Vegas Line Magazine, 
indicating that defendant had made an overnight stop and had traveled by way of Las 
Vegas, Nevada. Since the car had been rented in Tucson, defendant had apparently 
traveled out of his way to go through Nevada and spend the night there before traveling 
to his "family emergency" in Colorado (R.33). 
Defendant gave Haycock his driver's license, which had a hole punched in it. 
Haycock recognized this as an indication that the license was invalid, possibly 
suspended (R. 147:30). In light of the invalid license, suspicious circumstances, and 
defendant's irrational and increasingly nervous behavior, Haycock questioned defendant 
regarding drugs and the contents of his trunk, and fearing for his safety, made a quick 
search of the interior of defendant's car for weapons (R. 147:10). In the course of this 
search, Haycock smelled both marijuana and a strong, sweet coffee smell. Knowing 
that coffee is often used by drug couriers to mask the smell of marijuana, and not 
finding any coffee in the interior of the car, Haycock took the keys from the ignition 
and opened the car's trunk. Inside the trunk, Haycock found two duffle bags which 
smelled strongly of marijuana (R. 147:10). These bags contained 65 pounds of 
marijuana wrapped in fabric softener dryer sheets. These dryer sheets were permeated 
with the sweet coffee smell that Haycock detected inside the cab of the car (R. 147:12, 
43-44). Defendant was then arrested. 
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Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the 
warrantless search of his car (R.42-43). Following an evidentiary hearing where only 
Trooper Haycock testified (Addendum A), the trial court denied the motion (R.92) 
(Addendum B). The trial court found that Haycock had reasonable suspicion of 
criminal conduct based upon, inter alia, the fact that defendant had no apparent 
authorization to possess or drive the car, that he did not know the name of the person 
who had rented the car, offered a contradictory description of his trip, and was driving 
with an invalid license. The court ruled that "[defendant's agitated state and apparent 
deceptiveness, coupled with the remote location and the lack of immediate backup, 
created a reasonable concern for officer safety. Haycock was therefore entitled to 
make a protective sweep of the passenger compartment before proceeding with the 
inquiry" (R.96). Based upon the scent of marijuana and coffee in the passenger 
compartment of the car, the trial court found that there was probable cause to search 
the trunk of the car, and that due to exigent circumstances, the officer's search of the 
trunk without a warrant was therefore proper (R.96-97). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant does not dispute that Trooper Haycock had reasonable grounds to 
investigate based upon the lack of license plates on defendant's car. Instead, defendant 
challenges the method of investigation, claiming that before Haycock stopped 
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defendant, he should have driven up close to defendant in order to see whether the car 
had a valid temporary registration sticker in the window. This argument ignores the 
trial court's undisputed factual findings that Haycock did, in fact, pull up close enough 
to be able to see the vast majority of temporary stickers, and that defendant's sticker 
was invisible to the officer due to the tint and slant of the window. Haycock's traffic 
stop of defendant was the only reasonable means of investigating the lack of license 
plates on defendant's car. 
POINT II 
Defendant asserts that he reasonably thought that he was being detained at the 
time that he asked Haycock if he would like to inspect the lease agreement for his car, 
but fails to make any argument as to why defendant's belief that he was being detained 
should preclude Haycock from accepting defendant's wholly volunteered offer. There 
are no facts which would imply that defendant's apparently spontaneous offer was 
somehow coerced or even suggested by Haycock. 
As a result of Haycock's inspection of the volunteered lease agreement and 
unsolicited statements made by defendant, Haycock had reasonable grounds to further 
investigate; defendant was not authorized by the lease agreement to drive the car, did 
not know the name of the person who had rented it, and provided an inconsistent 
description of the nature of his trip. At the very least, Haycock was justified in seeking 
to inspect defendant's driver's license and questioning him further. 
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POINT III 
Trooper Haycock had reasonable concern for his safety, based upon defendant's 
unusually extreme and increasing agitation and nervousness, Haycock's reasonable 
suspicion that defendant might be transporting drugs, and the remote location and lack 
of backup. These factors made Haycock's weapons check of the passenger 
compartment of defendant's car reasonable. In the alternative, Haycock had grounds 
for arresting defendant for his lack of a valid driver's license at the time of Haycock's 
check of the passenger compartment, and the search may be upheld as incident to 
arrest. 
POINT IV 
Trooper Haycock smelled both marijuana and coffee within the passenger 
compartment of defendant's car, and Haycock knew from experience that coffee is 
often used to mask the smell of marijuana. It is well recognized that probable cause to 
search a vehicle may be based upon the smell of contraband and/or a masking agent, 
and this smell, along with Haycock's other observations regarding defendant and his 




THE TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT WAS PROPER; A LESS 
INTRUSIVE MEANS OF INVESTIGATING THE LACK OF LICENSE 
PLATES ON DEFENDANT'S CAR WAS NOT FACTUALLY POSSIBLE 
OR LEGALLY REQUIRED. 
Defendant does not dispute the trial court's finding that Trooper Haycock had 
reasonable cause to investigate whether defendant's car was properly licensed, based 
upon the fact that defendant's car did not have any license plates displayed. Rather, 
defendant questions the propriety of Trooper Haycock's traffic stop for purposes of 
conducting his investigation of this issue. Defendant maintains that Haycock could and 
should have satisfied himself regarding this issue without physically pulling defendant 
over for a brief investigation. This argument is made in the face of undisputed factual 
findings that no less intrusive means was available. 
In its ruling on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the 
uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing 
established that the temporary permit sticker in the rear window of defendant's 
vehicle was not visible. Since Haycock could see no license plate or temporary 
registration sticker as he approached the vehicle from behind, he had a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving a vehicle without registration. 
The court is convinced that the combination of tint, slant, and defroster 
element lines in the rear window made the sticker invisible to Haycock. 
(R.92-93) (emphasis added). In addition, the court specifically found that Haycock had 
approached defendant's vehicle from behind in such a manner that he "was close 
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enough to the rear of the vehicle to observe the great majority of temporary stickers." 
(R.93). 
Ignoring these findings, defendant proposes that Haycock should have first 
attempted to overtake defendant's vehicle in order to "look from a closer vantage point 
for a sticker the officer was unable to see at a distance." Brief of Appellant, p. 13. In 
fact, the court explicitly held that this is exactly what Haycock did, finding that 
Haycock drove up close enough to have been able to see the great majority of 
temporary stickers. Defendant further speculates that if the officer had somehow pulled 
up alongside and closer to his vehicle "it is reasonable to expect" that Haycock would 
have been able to see the sticker and somehow determine its validity. Id. There is 
simply no evidence to support such speculation. Moreover, this argument is contrary 
to the court's explicit finding that the sticker was invisible to Haycock. 
The only case cited by defendant in support of his argument actually confirms 
the correctness of the trial court's ruling. In State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969 (Utah 
App. 1992), the court held that even though the trooper was able to see a paper 
attached to the window of the defendant's vehicle, "the trooper's inability to identify 
the paper in the vehicle's back window as a valid temporary registration permit justified 
the stop of the vehicle." 827 P.2d at 971. Contrary to defendant's assertion that 
"evasive behavior" was a factor in approving the vehicle stop in Naisbitt, that ruling 
was based solely on the fact that, although the officer could see the temporary permit, 
11 
he was unable to verify its validity without making the stop. Id. See also United States 
v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728 (10th Cir. 1992) (traffic stop for lack of front license plate 
approved; although the state of origin did not require a front plate, there was no 
evidence that the officer could determine the state of origin prior to the stop.). In this 
case, there is no evidence that there was any way for Haycock to determine whether a 
temporary registration sticker existed at all, let alone that it was valid. 
Indeed, even if it is assumed (contrary to the evidence) that the sticker would 
have been visible if Haycock had pulled in close enough, a rule requiring an officer to 
drive up extremely close and carefully examine the rear window of a fast moving 
vehicle on a highway in an attempt to locate and verify the validity of a registration 
sticker would obviously pose serious safety concerns. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 
1416, 1425 (10th Cir. 1997) (officer not required to use least intrusive means in 
investigating temporary registration sticker: "Safety concerns justify means that are 
only minimally intrusive and that are not unreasonable in light of the purpose and 
circumstances of the stop"). 
12 
POINT II 
OFFICER HAYCOCK'S INSPECTION OF DEFENDANT'S LEASE 
AGREEMENT WAS CONSENSUAL AND FURTHER DETENTION OF 
DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
ARISING OUT OF THE CONTENTS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
A. Inspection of Lease Agreement. The trial court ruled that Haycock's 
inspection of the lease agreement was proper because it was the result of defendant's 
own offer to show the agreement to Haycock. The trial court found that Haycock had 
completed his investigation of the registration issue and had turned to leave at the time 
defendant voluntarily prolonged the encounter by offering to show Haycock his lease 
agreement. Defendant takes issue with the trial court's ruling by arguing that the court 
committed error in making the factual finding that Haycock had turned to leave before 
defendant made his offer, and that defendant therefore did not know that he was free to 
leave at the time he offered to allow Haycock to look at the lease agreement. See Brief 
of Appellant, p. 15. 
However, even if it is assumed that defendant was unaware that Haycock had 
completed his investigation, defendant has failed to articulate any argument whatsoever 
as to why this fact should render Haycock's acceptance of defendant's offer somehow 
improper. Even if it is assumed that defendant thought he was being detained at the 
time of his offer to show the officer his lease agreement, such does not affect the 
voluntariness of defendant's offer. Whether a defendant is being detained is only one of 
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several factors used in determining whether consent for a search in response to an 
officer's request may be considered voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1206 (Utah 1995) ("Whether a consent is voluntary depends upon the totality of 
the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of 
the police conduct. A consent that is the product of duress and coercion is not a 
consent at all.") (citations omitted). Thus, the factual issue which defendant raises, 
whether defendant knew he was free to go, would only be relevant in a case where an 
officer had made a request for a consent search, and would then only be one of several 
factors.2 In this case, defendant has not made any claim, either factually or legally, 
that his offer to show Haycock his lease agreement was a "product of duress and 
coercion." Indeed, far from coercing defendant's permission, Haycock did not even 
ask for it. Since there was no request, there can be no argument (and defendant makes 
none) that defendant's apparently spontaneous offer was somehow coerced from him by 
Haycock. C.f. State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 545-46 (Utah App. 1997) (spontaneous 
2
 In Harmon, the supreme court outlined the following factors for determining 
whether there was a lack of duress or coercion in obtaining consent for a search: "1) 
the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer." 910 P.2d at 1206. Even if the court were to apply this analysis to the facts of 
this case, all of these factors show that there was no improper coercion used by 
Haycock when he merely accepted defendant's offer. 
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statements made by a defendant while in custody are admissible even without Miranda 
warnings, since they do not result from interrogation). 
B. Reasonable Basis for Further Detention. Although defendant apparently 
concedes that Haycock's inspection of the lease agreement provided a reasonable basis 
for conducting further investigation of defendant, he challenges the scope of that 
investigation. Specifically, defendant challenges the fact that Haycock "remained with" 
defendant and asked to see his driver's license, making "numerous, detailed 
observations about the interior of the car" while defendant was looking for his license. 
Brief of Appellant, p.20. 
First, the evidence indicates that, as with the lease agreement, defendant 
voluntarily offered to show his license to Haycock. See Transcript of Suppression 
Hearing (R.147), p. 29 ("[defendant] asked me if I wanted to see it and I said, 'Yeah, I 
want to see your driver's license.'"). Thus, the existence of reasonable suspicion for 
Haycock to inspect defendant's license is not even at issue. 
Further, even if Haycock had demanded to see defendant's license, such a 
request would have been reasonable under the circumstances. As soon as Haycock had 
inspected defendant's lease agreement, he had abundant reasons to detain defendant for 
further investigation. Defendant did not know the name of the person who had rented 
the car. The lease agreement did not list defendant as an authorized driver of the car. 
Defendant claimed to be traveling from Tucson to Denver for a family emergency, but 
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had taken an indirect route to get there. In addition, defendant was becoming 
increasingly nervous, and offered an explanation about his driver's license that 
Haycock characterized as "gibberish" (R. 147:7). These undisputed discrepancies noted 
by Haycock are sufficient to justify additional detention in order to investigate. United 
States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th Cir. 1984) (driver of a rented vehicle was not 
listed as an authorized driver, justifying continued detention). See also State v. 
Shepard, 955 P.2d 353 (Utah App. 1998) (reasonable suspicion to investigate further 
when registration was a handwritten temporary, and there was a repair bill in someone 
else's name); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1993) (additional 
detention justified by fact that registration had someone else's name; driver unable to 
give address of the 'uncle' who loaned the car); State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 
1991) (detention justified when driver fails to produce identification or is not the 
owner); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1996) (implausible or 
contradictory travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity); 
United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998) (reasonable suspicion 
of illegal activity existed based upon no proof of ownership of the vehicle, having no 
proof of authority to operate the vehicle, and inconsistent statements about destination). 
At the very least, Haycock was justified in asking defendant to produce his driver's 
license. See United States v. Horn, 970 F.2d 728, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (officer 
properly requested to look at license and registration based solely on the fact that 
16 
defendant had pulled his car to a stop at an angle to the highway, even though the 
original reason for the traffic stop was fully resolved); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1133 (Utah 1994) ("a valid investigatory stop may include a request for identification 
and inquiry concerning the suspicious conduct of the person detained"), quoting 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700, n. 12 (1981).3 
Defendant's complaint is, then, that Haycock watched defendant and observed 
the interior of his car while defendant was searching for his license. Obviously, there 
is no rule requiring an officer to avert his gaze while a defendant locates his license and 
registration. State v. Holmes, 11r4 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah App. 1989) (officer may 
lawfully observe interior of vehicle while standing outside; "the officer was 'not 
3
 Defendant points out that, at this point, Haycock suspected that defendant was 
a drug courier, and argues that Haycock did not have a reasonable basis for such a 
suspicion. Defendant then argues that Haycock's observations would be insufficient to 
constitute probable cause to suspect defendant of possessing drugs. Brief of Appellant, 
p. 20. Indeed, Haycock admitted that he suspected defendant was a drug courier from 
the beginning of their encounter, long before there was any articulable basis for an 
investigation. However, Haycock's subjective intentions are not relevant for purposes 
of Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); State v. 
Preece, 971 P.2d 1, 5 n.5 (Utah App. 1998). 
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required to avert his eyes from that which [was] put before him/") quoting State v. 
Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983).4 
POINT III 
HAYCOCK PROPERLY SEARCHED THE PASSENGER 
COMPARTMENT OF DEFENDANT'S CAR IN ORDER TO INSURE 
HIS SAFETY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AS INCIDENT TO 
DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
A. Haycock's weapon search of the passenger compartment of defendant's 
car was properly based on reasonable safety concerns. 
The trial court held that the lease agreement, defendant's invalid driver's license, 
and Haycock's non-intrusive observations of the interior of defendant's car, along with 
defendant's contradictory statements concerning his travel plans and confusion over the 
identity of the person who rented the car, provided ample justification for further 
detention and investigation. See Ruling on Motion to Suppress, pp. 3-5 (R.94-96). 
Defendant does not dispute the trial court's findings in this regard. 
After finding that Haycock acted properly in continuing his investigation at this 
point in the encounter, the trial court found that Haycock was justified in fearing for his 
safety. "Defendant's agitated state and apparent deceptiveness, coupled with the 
4
 Defendant proposes that Haycock could have immediately gone back to his 
patrol car and called the rental company to inquire whether defendant was authorized to 
operate the car. Brief of Appellant, pp. 19-20. Indeed, Haycock testified that this 
could have been a reasonable step in his investigation. However, there is no basis for 
requiring Haycock to take that step prior to taking the equally reasonable steps of 
questioning defendant about the issue and looking at defendant's driver's license. 
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remote location and the lack of immediate back-up, created a reasonable concern for 
officer safety. Haycock was therefore entitled to make a protective sweep of the 
passenger compartment before proceeding with the inquiry." Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress, p. 5 (R.96). Again, defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual 
findings, questioning only whether these facts justify a weapons check of defendant's 
car. Brief of Appellant, p. 25. 
In fact, Haycock testified specifically about the nature of his safety concerns: 
"As a police officer, when I've dealt with people who wanted to hurt me and tried to 
hurt me, one of the first things that I observed about that person is they were afraid of
 r 
me, that they were scared, and they were more scared than other people in a similar 
traffic stop situation." Suppression Hearing Transcript (R.147), p. 40. The trial court 
accepted Haycock's testimony that defendant's behavior became increasingly erratic as 
the encounter progressed: "Defendant was more anxious than the average citizen, and 
his anxiety appeared to increase, rather than decrease, with the passage of time. He 
was unable to focus on putting on his shoes long enough to get both on them on." 
(R.94-95). 
Haycock's fear for his safety is also supported by his suspicion that defendant 
may have been transporting drugs. Haycock articulated reasonable grounds for his 
belief that defendant may be transporting drugs, as listed by the trial court in its Order 
(R.94-95). These facts include the officer's knowledge that defendant was driving a 
19 
rental car not rented by him, had given an apparently false description of his destination 
or reasons for his trip, and was traveling along a known drug courier route.5 Since 
Haycock reasonably suspected drug involvement in this case, his fears regarding 
defendant's possible possession of a weapon would be expected to increase. See State 
v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah App. 1997) (weapon search of jacket justified 
solely on basis of officer's suspicion of possible drug transporting offense), citing State 
v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging officer could reasonably assume individuals suspected of participating 
in moving large quantities of illegal drugs over long distances may be armed). 
In light of the circumstances of this situation, Haycock's weapons check of the 
passenger compartment of defendant's car is a reasonable precaution. "[T]he issue is 
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.... And in determining whether the 
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given ... to the 
5Virtually identical facts were held sufficient to support a finding of reasonable 
cause to suspect drug smuggling in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (1990). This finding was based upon the following: "[defendant] 
produced a New York driver's license and a California rental agreement for the 
vehicle. When questioned about the rental agreement, [defendant] said he was going 
skiing in Colorado and planned to return the car to San Diego, California. However, 
the rental agreement indicated the car was to be returned to New York in five days, the 
approximate time it takes to drive directly from California to New York. In addition, 
[defendant] was driving along a well-known drug trafficking route." 791 P.2d at 884. 
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specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). In light of defendant's unusually 
extreme nervous and erratic behavior, which was increasing during the course of the 
encounter, and Haycock's suspicion that defendant may have been involved in 
transporting drugs, a brief weapons check was a reasonable step to insure the officer's 
safety while continuing his investigation. See also Seattle v. Hall, 806 P.2d 1246, 
1249-50 (Wash App. 1991) (weapons frisk upheld; defendant made statements that the 
officer considered "defensive" and behaved in ways that the officer described as 
"antsy," "hostile," and "nervous," and his hands were hidden). 
B. Haycock's search of the passenger compartment was proper as incident 
to arrest of defendant for driving without a valid license. 
In the alternative, even if this Court were to find that the trial court erred in 
finding that Haycock's weapon sweep was reasonable, an even more extensive search 
of the passenger compartment of defendant's car was proper as a search incident to 
defendant's arrest pursuant to New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of 
passenger compartment of car allowed as incident to arrest of the driver). See State v. 
Gallegos, 111 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985) (appellate court may affirm a ruling on any 
basis, even if not relied on below). 
It is undisputed that defendant did not have a valid driver's license (R.95), which 
is a violation of Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §§ 53-3-202(5), 227 (1996). As a result, 
21 
defendant was subject to immediate arrest. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1204 
(Utah 1995) (arrest for lack of a valid license is reasonable; such an offense is different 
from an offense such as speeding, since "allowing [defendant] to 'proceed on her way' 
without a valid license permits the continuation of her unlawful activity"). Although 
the record does not indicate whether Haycock had decided to arrest defendant for 
driving without a license at the time of the search, consideration of Haycock's state of 
mind is not an element of Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 
U.S. 806 (1996) ("'the fact that [an] officer does not have the state of mind which is 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the justification for the officer's action does 
not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
that action.' . . . Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth 
Amendment analysis."), quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). 
A search of defendant's car as incident to arrest may thus be upheld as incident 
to his arrest, even if the officer actually conducts the search for some other reason. See 
State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220 (Utah App. 1995) (search upheld as incident to an 
arrest upheld even though the officer thought he was doing a weapons frisk; intent of 
the officer is irrelevant to the analysis); State v. White, 577 P.2d 552 (Utah 1978) 
(search conducted by officers based upon consent upheld as a search incident to arrest: 
"if such probable cause for arrest exists independent of any evidence obtained as a 
result of the search, the fact that the search was conducted before the actual arrest does 
22 
not invalidate the search nor preclude its characterization as being incident to the 
arrest."); State v. Giron, 943 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1997) (invalid inventory search 
upheld as incident to valid arrest). See also People v. Barrientos, 956 P.2d 634 (Colo 
App. 1997) (search upheld as incident to arrest because the officer "could have" 
arrested defendant for lack of proof of insurance); State v. Kendig, 865 P.2d 218 
(Kansas App. 1993) (automobile search upheld as incident to arrest because of the 
officer's prior plain view sighting of illegal fireworks in the passenger compartment) 
Defendant was subject to arrest for lack of a valid license, and Haycock's search of the 
passenger compartment of his car should be upheld as incident to his arrest. 
6 
6
 In Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S.Ct. 484 (1998), the Supreme Court invalidated a 
state law authorizing a search in cases where police elect not to make a custodial arrest 
and instead issue a citation, reasoning that once a citation has been issued, the 
justification for a search incident to arrest (safety and preservation of evidence) 
disappears. However, in this case, an arrest for lack of a driver's license is reasonable 
and expected when there is no other driver, and no citation was issued prior to the 
search. See State v. Bauman, 586 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1998) (rehearing denied Jan. 
27, 1999, subsequent to Knowles decision). In Bauman, a search of a car was upheld 
on the basis of probable cause to arrest for giving false information to the officer, even 
though there was no prior arrest and the search had been conducted on plain view 
grounds. Defendant was issued a citation after the search, and released. Since 
probable cause to arrest existed prior to search, later citation does not affect the 
authority to search incident to arrest. 
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POINT IV 
THE SMELL OF MARIJUANA AND COFFEE IN THE PASSENGER 
COMPARTMENT OF THE CAR PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SEARCH DEFENDANT'S TRUNK. 
In upholding Haycock's search of defendant's trunk, the trial court found that 
Haycock had smelled marijuana and a strong odor of coffee while he was searching the 
passenger compartment. Defendant does not challenge the evidentiary basis for the 
court's factual finding, and it is well established that the smell of marijuana provides 
probable cause to search a car's trunk. State v. Wright, No. 981058-CA, 1999 WL 
144506, slip op. at 2 (Utah App. March 18, 1999) (,fiit is well settled that the odor of 
marijuana emanating from a vehicle establishes probable cause for the warrantless 
search of that vehicle.'"), quoting State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Defendant's only objection is to question whether Haycock's testimony regarding 
the nature of the smell is sufficient; Haycock testified that the marijuana odor was 
weak, while the coffee smell was strong. However, it is clear that the officer's 
knowledge and experience regarding the odors he detects must be considered in 
determining whether probable cause exists. Wright, slip op. at 2 ("an officer's special 
familiarity with how controlled substances smell is germane to evaluating whether an 
officer had probable cause to search and seize.") In this case, Haycock testified that the 
strong odor of coffee, in a passenger compartment where no coffee is found, indicates 
24 
that the coffee is being used as a masking agent (R. 147:11-12). See United States v. 
Sanchez-Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1993) (coffee is "known to be used by 
drug transporters to cover the smell of a controlled substance"); United States v. 
Glover, 104 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir. 1997) (probable cause to search was properly based 
on strong coffee smell and feel of packages); United States v. Clarke, 786 F. Supp. 7, 
11 (D.D.C. 1991) (same). Indeed, the fact that the marijuana smell was weaker than 
the strong coffee smell is indicative of nothing other than that the masking agent was to 
some degree effective. 
Accordingly, the trial court was correct in finding that the odor of marijuana 
detected by the officer, along with the strong smell of coffee and the officer's other 
observations regarding defendant's contradictory travel plans, rental car, drug route, 
nervousness, etc., provided adequate probable cause for this search. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress and should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5 . day of May, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: --Bugyik, 971700044. It appears that 
Mr. Bugyik is here and Mr. Edmonds is representing him, is 
also here. Are you ready to go, Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You concede that there was a 
warrantless search? 
MR. BENGE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right, since you have the burden 
of showing that there was some exception to the warrant 
requirement that applies, you may proceed to present the 
evidence? 
MR. BENGE: Thank you, Your Honor, we'll call Rich 
Haycock. 
RICH HAYCOCK, 
having first been duly and legally sworn was 
examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BENGE; 
Q State your name please. 
A Richard Haycock. 
2 0
 Q How are you employed? 
21 A Trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol 
22 Q H ° w long have you been so employed? 
23 I A Since May 12, 1984 
2 4 Q Your total law enforcement experience? 








1 II Q Calling your attention to the 6th day of March of 
2 this year, were you on duty? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And did you have an occasion on that day to make 
contact with Mr. Bugyik? 
A Yes. 
Q What were the circumstances? 
A I was on 1-70, stationary at mile marker 180. Mr. 
8
 Bugyik drove by me at that location. 
9 Q Was there anything that you noticed about the 
10 1 vehicle when it went by you that led you to a vehicle stop? 
A Yes, sir, I noticed that there was no license 
plates on the car. 
Q After noticing this, what did you do? 
A I pursued the vehicle. I stopped the vehicle at 
mile post 182 eastbound 1-70. 
Q What kind of a vehicle was this, Rich? 
1 6
 A It was a red Ford or Mercury Sable. 
17 Q Later model? 
18 1 A It was new, a 1997. 
Q Did you get the vehicle to stop? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what happened after the vehicle was stopped? 
A I exited my vehicle, the driver of the vehicle 
exited the driver's side and met me between his vehicle and 
my vehicle. 







































in the vehicle that you stopped other than the driver? 
A Yes, I could see that there was no one seated in 
the vehicle other than the driver. 
Q At what point did the driver meet you? 
A He exited his vehicle immediately, walked back 
toward me. He asked me immediately why I stopped him. 
Q Describe the driver, his dress, demeanor upon your 
first seeing him. 
A He was dressed in a t-shirts and shorts, he didn't 
have any shoes on, and he looked scared. 
Q After asking you what this was about, what 
happened? 
A I told him I'd stopped him because there was no 
registration on the car, and he stated that the car was a 
rental, the car, and that there should be registration on it 
somewhere. 
Q What then happened? 
A I moved up along the side of his car right by the 
trunk and from that position I saw what I thought might be a 
temporary sticker pasted in the back window. And I looked 
at the sticker and it was a temporary out of the state of 
Arizona, it was a valid 90 day temporary permit, 
registration permit for the car. 
Q After seeing that at that point, what happened? 
A At that point I was preparing just to depart and 
leave, Mr. Bugyik invited me to stay. 







1 II A He asked me if I wanted to see his lease 
2 agreement. 
Q Now, at that point before he asked you if you 
wanted to see his lease agreement, you had seen that the car 
did have a temporary sticker, is that right? 
A It did. 
Q And at that point was Mr. Bugyik free to go? 
A He was. 
8
 Q And, in fact, were you preparing to leave? 
9 A Yes, I was. 
10 I  Q s ° / where was he standing, where were you standing 
when he asked you if you wanted to see his lease agreement? 
A He was standing right by the rear window the 
driver's side probably just two feet to my left, and this 
temporary was in the upper left hand rear window. 
Q And how much time had elapsed to this point, 
Trooper Haycock? 
\ A 3 0 seconds maybe. 
17 Q Just the time it took you and him to meet at the 
18 rear of his car and you to see that he did in fact have a 
1 9 temporary sticker? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q So after he asked you if you wanted to see his 
lease agreement, what did happen? 
A I said, "Sure, Ifd like to see that, if you don't 
mind." And he immediately entered the car and produced an 


















1 I  Q And did you look at that? 
2 A I did. As he was giving me the envelope he told 
me that, he'd slanged without me asking, that the car had 
been rented by a Dr. Dean Allen and that he had a family 
medical emergency, the driver had a family medical emergency 
in Denver, Colorado that he needed to get and he was in a 
hurry to do that. 
Q Did he tell you this about Dr. Dean Allen and the 
8
 family medical emergency in Denver before he handed you the 
9 lease agreement or contemporaneous? 
lo [J A Yes, as he was handing it to me. 
Q Then what happened? 
A I opened the lease agreement and looked at it and 
I immediately noticed that the vehicle was rented in Tucson, 
Arizona, that it was rented by Dean Porter not Dean Allen, 
and that it listed no additional drivers allowed to drive. 
Q Okay. What then happened? 
A While I was looking at the lease agreement and 
1 7 || without asking he started to explain to me about his 
18 driver's license, his Arizona driver's license. 
1 9 Q What did he tell you about his Arizona driver's 
license? 
A He just kept explaining and explaining, it was 
more just gibberish, just stuttering. 





















1 II Q When, originally? 
2 | A No, after I noticed that Dean Porter rented the 
car instead of Dean Allen and there was no drivers on the 
car, this man was more nervous at this particular point than 
initially, his fear and his nervousness started to increase 
from the point of contact to this. At this point he was 
stuttering and stammering and having a hard time controlling 
himself. 
8
 Q So what did he tell you about his Arizona driver's 
9 license? 
10 A H e produced it, he got in the car and started 
- - digging. He said it was in some papers in the car in his 
bag and if he could get it, and he started to do that. And 
he backed out of the car and he said to me, "Can I put some 
shoes on?" I said, "Yeah, you can put some shoes on. It's 
probably burning your feet." It was hot that day. He puts 
one shoe on, gets back in the car, starts digging for his 
driver's license and I said, "Well, maybe you ought to stop 
1 7 for a second here and put your other shoe on." 
18 So he says, "Okay," so he gets his other shoe and 
19 puts it on. Then he retrieves a pink envelope out of his 
luggage and he produced an Arizona driver's license that was 
punched which is an indication that it's suspended. 
Q Based upon that what then happened? 
A While he was doing that I made some observations 
about the car and I was trying to determine why he was 





































safety, people don't behave this way on traffic stops. And 
I noticed that he had a road map on his front seat and it 
was opened to the state of Colorado. I noticed that in this 
rental car the keys were in the ignition and he had a lot of 
keys on the key ring and he had several advertisements 
hooked to that key ring also. And I noticed that was 
different than people who rent rental cars, they don't put 
all their keys and advertisements on the key ring. I 
noticed an envelope from Days Inn in this luggage which 
would indicate that he had stayed at a motel. 
Q In this luggage where? 
A It was in the back seat. I noticed that his 
luggage was in the back seat instead of in the trunk. I 
noticed he had a Domino's pizza box and a couple of cans of 
Cherry Coke so he'd been eating in the car. I noticed for 
some unknown reason, it was hot, that the passenger window 
was partially rolled down. I noticed that he was more 
scared, more nervous than other people in a similar type 
situation. 
I noticed that the lease agreement was not in his 
name nor did he have a right to drive the car. I noticed a 
magazine in the car from a motel that's usually in motel 
rooms and it was called Las Vegas Line and it's a 
complimentary magazine from motels. And I made some 
determinations about these things that I saw. 
Q Based upon all the factors, what happened? 








1 I  was in the car. 
2 Q What did he say? 
A He said none, and he denied there being any 
marijuana in the car. And I said, "What's in the trunk?" 
And he said, "There's nothing in the trunk and you're not 
going to look." So I said, "Well, if you have nothing to 
hide in the trunk why can't I look?" And he said, "Well, 
you're not going to look," he says, "I don't know what's in 
the trunk, I've never been in the trunk, but you're not 
9 I going to look." 
10 I Q So he first said there's nothing in the trunk and 
then he said he's never been in the trunk? 
A That's what he said. 
Q Okay, what then happened, Trooper Haycock? 
A I, at that point, made a quick scan around the 
driver's seat of the car and within his immediate reach of 
where he was seated in the vehicle to see if there was any 
weapons in the car and there was not, and so at that point I 
1 7 || removed the keys from the ignition and walked around and 
18 unlocked the trunk. 
1 9 Q What happened when you unlocked the trunk? 
A Inside the trunk there was two duffle bags. I 
bent over, smelled the duffle bags, there was a strong odor 
of marijuana in those duffle bags. And just to back up, 
while I was in the car and made a frisk of the car for 
weapons I detected an odor and I thought it was coffee, a 



















1 I  Q Okay, so this was after he had told you there was 
2 nothing in the trunk and before you looked in the trunk? 
A That's correct. 
Q So while you were looking for a weapon search in 
the body of the car? 
A That's correct. 
Q What did you smell? 
A I thought it was a strong odor of coffee, that's 
8
 I  what I registered in my mind that there was, and I didn't 
9 see any coffee around, I didn't see any coffee grounds or 
10 anY coffee cups or any coffee in the car. There was a 
-- strong odor. There was also a very weak odor of marijuana 
seemed to be in the car. 
Q Have you had any special training in your 20 years 
in law enforcement in drug intervention? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And, in fact, you've been a professor or teacher 
or drug intervention? 
17 I  A Yes, sir. 
18 Q And based upon your training and experience does, 
19 did the coffee odor mean anything to you? 
A Yes, sir, it does. 
Q What? 
A I know that some people when they're trying to 
secret something that has a strong odor and they're trying 
to secret that odor that they use coffee grounds to do that. 


















1 I  A Yes, they do, 
2 Q After, so what happened after you smelled the 
coffee odor, you smelled a weak odor of marijuana, was it at 
that point that you opened the trunk? 
A It was. 
Q And what did you find in the trunk? 
A I found the two duffle bags and in those duffle 
bags there was nine bundles of marijuana. 
8
 Q And what was the weight of that marijuana? 
9 A I believe that it was around 65 pounds, including 
10 [| the wrap. 
Q Did you ever have any further conversations with 
the defendant? 
A I did. He, I asked him to help me out on this 
particular case, asked him if he was willing to cooperate, 
drive the marijuana through, he told me he knew nothing of 
the marijuana. He insisted he had a medical emergency in 
•^ Denver. He insisted that he was framed and was innocent. 
1 7 Shortly after that he asked for an attorney and no further 
18 I questions were asked. 
1 9 II MR. BENGE: That's all I have, 
0 I CROSS EXAMINATION 
2 1 I! BY MR. EDMONDS; 
22 Q Trooper Haycock, I saw in the paper the other day 
22 I  that somebody said that Highway Patrol people are not 
troopers anymore. Are you still Trooper Haycock, is that 













1 I  A I guess that's fine if that's what you want to 
2 call me. I received a paper that says I'm a VAS Officer 
Haycock now. 
Q Is it okay if I call you Trooper Haycock? 
A It's just fine. 
Q Trooper Haycock, you said at the time you saw this 
car you had done that because you thought that there was a 
registration violation? 
8
 I  A Yes, sir. 
9 Q And you also said that this stop occurred during 
10 | the day time? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you also said that almost immediately after 
you made the stop and got out of the car you saw a temporary 
Arizona sticker in the window of the car that you had 
stopped, is that right? 
A Yes. 
1 6
 Q Was that sticker displayed properly? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q And was the sticker, you said that you checked it. 
2_9 Do you mean that you looked at it visually or that you ran 
something through the dispatcher? 
A I looked at it visually. 
Q And it contained then adequate information in 
adequate size letters and as far as you could determine 
there was nothing unlawful about the way it was displayed or 













1 I  A Thatf s correct. 
2 Q So in effect, there was no reason for you to stop 
the car? 
A Yeah, I didn't see any license plates so I think I 
had a reason. 
Q Have you had typical experience with drug 
interdiction in which rental cars are used? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Is it your experience that rental cars are 









Q Is it your experience that those rental cars 
frequently have some other indicia maybe including some of 
the things that you've told us about here today that leave 
you to believe that they may be used by drug couriers? 
A Yes. 
Q You said that one of the things that you noticed 
about this car early on was that the luggage was in the 
17 I  interior of the car, is that right? 
18 A Yes. 
i g Q And you said that you noticed that the luggage had 
some tags on it that indicated to you that the possessor of 
the luggage had stayed at a motel, is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And you also said, did you not, that the driver of 
the car, Mr. Bugyik, had told you that he was in a hurry to 













1 II A Yes. 
2 Q Was there anything about those items that you and 
I have just discussed that's inconsistent with him being on 
his way to Denver in an emergency, for example, having 
packed quickly or something? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And what would that be? 
A If he was on his way to Denver for a family 
8 emergency he would have not taken the long way around and 
9 went to Las Vegas and stayed in a motel room. He would have 
10 H come up 191 through Moab and Monticello and saved himself 
about four hours travel time. 
Q So at that point you knew where he had come from? 
A That's correct. 
Q And how did you know where he had come from at 
that point? 
A Because he was on 1-70 eastbound and had not come 
up 191. He had a Las Vegas Line magazine in his car and he 
17 I] had an envelope out of Days Inn. 
18 Q But you don't know where his journey began, do 
19 I you? 
A Yes, sir, I do. It began in Tucson, Arizona, 
because it was on the lease agreement. 
Q But didn't you just say that some of the things 
that made you initially suspicious occurred before you had 
seen the lease agreement? 



















1 I  getting his driver's license when I observed these things. 
2 Q All right. You said that Mr. Bugyik, from the 
very outset, look frightened to you and I think you've 
characterized his appearance as more frightened than people 
in that situation usually are, is that fair to say? 
A Yes. 
Q Did that raise your suspicions? 
A Yes. 
8
 Q And did you, at that point, have an opinion or 
9 have a feeling or as you put it at the preliminary hearing 
10 1 in this case, a hunch that maybe something was illegal going 
on here? 
A I don't believe that I stated that I had a hunch 
in the preliminary hearing. In fact, I know I did not state 
that. 
MR. EDMONDS: Give me just a moment please. 
Q BY MR. EDMONDS: Did you have a hunch? 
1 6
 A I wouldn't characterize it as a hunch, no. 
17 Q How would you characterize it? 
18 A I would characterize it as my sense of my fear, my 
19 physical sense of fear was starting to increase. 
Q Okay. In fact, in your report you wrote that Mr. 
Bugyik's nervous demeanor and his behavior made you fear for 
your safety, is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And the first thing you did in that regard was 


















1 I  A I did not. 
2 Q You eventually said that you put your head in the 
car and looked around for weapons and that presumably, am I 
correct, that that was consistent and consonant and 
connected with your fear for your safety because of his 
demeanor? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you, at that point, search his person for 
8
 weapons? 
9 A No, sir. 
10 Q Did you move anything around in the car searching 
- - for weapons? 
A I believe I looked under the road map on the 
driver's seat, I looked under the seat. 
Q Now, let's take a minute and talk about that road 
map. You've listed the road map as one of the things that 
caused you concern or raised your suspicion, what was it 
about that road map that made you more suspicious, Trooper? 
1 7 I  A Well, two things. First of all, I often see road 
18 maps in cars driven by drug couriers, that's the first. 
1 9 I Second of all, Mr. Bugyik told me that his family was in 
Denver, Colorado and I would presume he would know how to 
get there. 
Q Is the road map something that itself would raise 
your suspicion? 
A Not by itself but the totality of the 



















1 jj Q Did you happen to notice which map was displayed? 
2 | A Yes, sir, it was the state of Colorado, sir. 
Q So that he was headed for Colorado, in fact, not 
very far from it, is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And it was a Colorado road map displayed sitting 
on the passenger seat? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You said that in your concern for your safety you 
9 I  put your head -- did you actually get in the car and sit 
10 I down? 
A No, sir, I did not. 
Q You put your head and shoulders inside, looked 
around, what? 
A Probably put one knee on the car leaning across 
the car to lift up the road map. 
Q One knee on what, the driver's seat? 
A The driver's seat, yes, sir, or the floor board 
17 I  there. 
18 Q Okay, and did you look in the back seat to look 
1 9 for weapons in there? 
A I looked, yes. 
Q Where was Mr. Bugyik at the time that you were 
making this search for weapons? 
A He was standing at the front right of the car by 
the door. 
































A I don't recall. 
Q And you say he was — 
A He was within my vision. 
Q Okay, you say he was standing at the right front 
side of the car? 
A He was right by the door there by me as I recall. 
Q Did you get in the driver's side or the 
passenger's side? 
8
 A The driver's side. 
9 Q And he was standing on the driver's side or the 
10 passenger's side? 
1 1 A He was standing on the driver's side. 
Q Okay, so that would be the--
A The left front side of the car. 
Q You said that you kept him in your view the whole 
time while you were looking in the car? 
A As best I could. 
Q All right. Was it then that you smelled the 
1 7 I  coffee and the marijuana? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q And you said that there was a very strong odor of 
coffee? 
A Yes, 
Q Did you find any coffee in the car? 
A No, sir, I did not. 
Q Did anybody find any coffee in the car? 








1 || Q So you were wrong about that smell of coffee? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q But you said it was a very strong smell to you? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Never saw Mr. Bugyik with a 7-11 cup or you never 
saw any coffee discarded near the scene and you never saw 
any packages containing coffee, did you? 
A No, I did not. 
8
 I  Q None at all? 
9 A None. 
10 Q A H right. You said that, let's back up to the 
- - point at which you had stopped, Mr. Bugyik had stopped, you 
and he had met somewhere between the two vehicles. You had 
ascertained that the registration of the vehicle was in fact 
lawful and that it was in fact valid and it was displayed 
correctly. You said that you were preparing to leave, is 
that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
17 I  Q And you said that he then invited you to stay? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
1 9 Q Now, isn't that really your interpretation that 
you have imposed on something that he said to you. He 
didn't say, "Please stay," or, "I want you to stay," or 
"Will you hang around," or "Will you stay around for a 
minute," did he? 
A Not in those words. 


































want to see the lease agreement?" 
A Yes, sir, that's what he said. 
Q Now, at that point did you need to see the lease 
agreement to effect anything about that stop? 
A No, I did not. 
Q In fact, you didn't need to do anything more with 
Mr. Bugyik except let him get back in the car and drive 
away, did you? 
A That's correct. 
Q And so at that point you made a determination that 
you were going to continue forward with this encounter 
1:L I  especially since he had invited you to see the lease 
agreement, is that right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And at that point you had observed that he was, 
well, what had you observed that was suspicious? 
A That he was scared. 
Q Okay, anything else? 
1 7
 I  A I observed he wasn't armed at that particular 
18 point because he was wearing a t-shirt and shorts and his 
X9 I belly was sticking out from under his t-shirt. 
Q And he didn't presumably, didn't have a gun 
sticking in the back of his pants or something? 
A Didn't see it. 








1 jl Q It wasn't? 
2 II ^ No* 
„ Q All right. So what all then was suspicious at 
that point? 
A The fact that he was scared is suspicious but the 
fact that he goes, "Do you want to see the lease 
agreements," and the fact he stated--
Q No, no, I'm just saying what all was suspicious, 
8 just that he was afraid, anything else? 
9 I A That's all. 
10 I Q And that was a pretty good break for you, wasn't 
it? 
A Absolutely. 
Q Because you were suspicious that there was 
something else going on, weren't you? 
A Yeah. 
Q And when he asked to see that lease agreement that 
was your ticket to keep looking and keep following up your 
17 I  suspicion, wasn't it? 
18 II A Yes. 
Q You said that as you were preparing to leave he 
invited you to stay and we've now determined that what he 
did in that regard was say, "Do you want to see the lease 
agreement," and in response to Mr. Benge's question, "Was he 






















1 II Q Was he free to go after he asked to see the lease 
2 agreement, asked you to see the lease agreement, if you 




Q Did you tell him that? 
A No. 
8 Q And you know that you don't have to tell him that, 
9 don't you? 
10 | A That's correct. 
Q And so you were even luckier, weren't you? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q I admire your candor. You said that there was 
only about 3 0 seconds that had elapsed at the time that all 
of this discussion about the lease agreement took place, 
from the time you stopped until someone said lease 
agreement, only about 3 0 seconds, is that right? 
17 I  A Yes. 
18 Q And in that 3 0 seconds you had determined 
1 9 || everything that you've talked about, the registration was 
valid, the sticker was timely, the sticker was properly 
displayed, and he was acting nervous? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You said that he produced a Hertz envelope 
and you then opened it up or did he open it? 



















1 II Q And what was in it? 
2 I A The lease agreement. 
Q And you say that you noticed that on the lease 
agreement, what did you notice on the lease agreement? 
A I noticed that the lease agreement was rented. 
Q Oh, you have it with you? 
A I do. 
Q Oh. 
8 A I noticed that the lease agreement was in the name 
9 of Dean Porter. 
10 I Q Okay, so was that suspicious to you? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. So, it was suspicious to you because, 
why was it suspicious? 
A Because he said it was Dean Allen. 
Q When did he tell you that? 
A He told me that, while I was standing there 
looking at the temporary registration, that he had a medical 
1 7 emergency in Denver, Colorado, and that Dr. Dean Allen had 
18 rented the car for him. 
1 9 Q Okay, so there was a little bit more dialogue in 
the 3 0 second period then just your determination that the 
sticker was valid and his question, "Do you want to see the 
rental agreement?" He gave you some more details about the 
trip? 
A Yes. 































1 || details. Did you say where are you going or where did you 
start? 
A No, sir. 
Q You didn't? 
A No. 
Q Do you ever do that as a matter of course when you 
make stops like this? 
A Sometimes. 
8
 Q But you didn't in this case? 
9 A I did not. 
10 1 Q Was there some reason why you didn't in this case? 
A Because he volunteered it. 
Q All right. So you and he are standing at the car, 
you have determined the registration's okay, and he then 
volunteered to you some details about the trip and that was 
before he offered to let you see the rental agreement? 
A It was while he was walking to get the rental 
agreement. 
17 (I Q Did you follow him to get the rental agreement? 
18 A Just a couple of steps forward. I was right by 
!9 the back window. 
Q Of his car? 
A Of his car. 
Q So you then actually did follow him a little bit 
forward where he retrieved the rental agreement? 
A Yes, sir. 








ill A Somewhere in the front, I'm not 100 percent sure. 
2 Q Did you look in the car to see exactly where he 
got it from? 
A I don't know where he got it from. 
Q But you said you were afraid that he had some 
weapons. 
A And that *s why I was stepped forward to make sure 
that when his hands came out of that car it had an envelope 
in it and not a gun. 
9 II Q But you didn't watch where his hands were in the 
10 I car? 
A I couldn't see. 
Q No. All right. The rental agreement contained 
the name of someone that was different than the name he had 
given you? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you also said that the rental agreement was in 
only one person's name and showed no alternative drivers, is 
17 that right? 
18 || A Yes. 
Q Is that a crime? 
A Yes. 
Q It is? 
A It is. 
Q It's a crime in Utah to drive a rental car that 
you have not been named as a driver on? 

































Q So you consider then at that point that this car 
was stolen? 
A You don't know the name of the person who rented 
it and he's not on the lease agreement, what am I to 
presume? 
Q Well, no, that's, I don't know what you're to 
presume. My question is, did you at that point consider 
that this was a stolen car? 
8
 A That was an option, yes, sir, that was something 
9 that absolutely needed to be investigated. 
10 I Q So at that point he certainly wasn't free to go? 
A That's correct. 
Q And from that point forward, you had no intention 
ever of letting him leave that scene until you'd done a lot 
more looking into things? 
A Until I had either confirmed or dispelled my 
suspicions. 
Q Now, I want to be clear about this, would there 
17 I  have been anything that would have dispelled your suspicions 
18 about his inability to, or about the rental agreement not 
3_9 || showing him as an authorized driver. Would anything have 
satisfied you about that? 
A Ask me that question again. 
Q If after you determined that the rental agreement 
did not show Mr. Bugyik as an authorized driver, is there 
anything that you could have done that would have dispelled 








1 || have let him go on his way if nothing else had happened? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What would that have been? 
A Calling Hertz on the telephone and asking them if 
they had listed him in some way. 
Q Did you ever do that? 
A No. 
Q Because you couldn't get past the name, could you? 
8 II A No. 
9 Q The name was wrong, wasn't it? 
10 | A That's right. 
Q Okay, so did you think the car was stolen then 
because of the name, the wrong surname? 
A The totality of the circumstances. 
Q Did you look at the rental agreement before or 
after Mr. Bugyik told you that he had, that it had been 
rented by a Dr. Somebody or other. 
1 6
 A Mr. Bugyik told me that the car had been rented by 
17 Dr. Dean Allen. He then retrieved the rental agreement and 
18 || handed it to me. I looked at the rental agreement and it 
showed that it was rented by Dean Porter. 
Q Did the fact that the word doctor wasn't on Dean 
























1 || this emergency that occurred that was supposedly occurring 
in Denver? 
A I tried. He said I was trying to trip him up and 
frame him and he invoked his right to an attorney. 
Q So that must have been after you found the 
marijuana? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he use the word medical emergency at the very 
8
 I  outset or did he say something else? Are those your words 
9 or his? 
10 1 A I believe he used medical emergency and that was 
his words. 
Q You said that at some point he started explaining 
to you something about his driver's license and that that 




 Q When in relation to your examining the rental 
17 agreement did you ask him to see the driver's license? 
18 I  A I got the rental agreement in my hand and when I 
saw Dean Porter I gave him a chance at that point. I asked 
him again, I said, "Now, who rented the car?" And he said 
Dr. Dean Allen. He insisted Dr. Dean Allen, Dean Porter, 
and then he started explaining about his driver's license 
and asked me if I wanted to see it and I said, "Yeah, I want 
to see your driver's license." 














1 | A He knew that that was next in line. 
2 I Q Well, you're assuming. He didn't say, "I know 
that's next in line." That's what you assume, isn't it? 
A Yeah 
4 ~ 




agreement he volunteered the license, is that right? 
A Yeah, he was going for it, yes. 
Q But you were going to get it anyway, weren't you? 
8
 II A Yeah. 
9 Q Okay, and it wasn't valid? 
10 1 A It was not. 
Q And it was not valid because of what? 
A It was suspended. 
Q It was suspended? 
A By the state of Arizona. 
Q Okay, and when did you determine that? 
A When it had a hole punched through it. 
16
 Q So it's your experience that if an Arizona 
17 driver's license has a hole punched through it that's a 
18 || suspension? 
A It's invalid. 
Q Just invalid for any reason? 
A Yes. 
Q Could be because it's expired? 
A That's correct. 
Q So not necessarily suspended? 







































Q Okay, at this point Mr. Bugyik is getting more 
nervous? You said, I think, that he displayed increasing 
nervousness during the entire encounter up until the 
marijuana showed up or you found the marijuana, is that fair 
to say, is that a fair characterization? 
A Yes. 
Q And you said that at one point he was sufficiently 
nervous that he asked you to put on his shoes and he only 
put on one shoe, is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And he got in the car then and started rummaging 
around and you told him to get back out and put his other 
shoe on? 
A Yes. 
Q Did he do that? 
A Yes. 
Q What was he rummaging around in the front or the 
back? 
A In the back. 
Q How many pieces of luggage were in the back? 
A One duffle bag. 
Q And could you just show me with your hands or give 
me an estimate as to the size of the duffle bag? 
A It was about 30 by 15 or 16. 
Q In diameter? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And was it closed up? 
32 
X | A It was zipped open. 
2 Q Zipped open? 
A Yes. 













A On the top, 
Q On the 15 inch side or the 30 inch side? 
A On the 3 0 inch running the full length. 
8 Q Did you look in that duffle bag before you looked 
9 in the trunk? 
10 A No, I did not. 
-- Q Did you look in that duffle bag when Mr. Bugyik 
was standing outside the car up near the front? 
A I was looking into it, yes. Oh, say that again. 
Q Did you look in that duffle bag when Mr. Bugyik 
was standing outside the car up near the front of the car? 
A No. 
16
 Q What could you see from outside the car that was 
17 in that duffle bag? 
18 I A At what point? 
Q At the point that you first saw it. 
A I just noticed that there was luggage on the rear 
seat, the duffle bag. 
Q Okay, and there was a tag on that luggage, that's 
the one with the--
A No, I think, you use the word tag and characterize 








1 || Q Oh, okay, and where was that? 
A It was, it's this here. It was inside the 
luggage. When he got his driver's license out this was, 
come out with his driver's license. 
Q Okay, so that, I think you said that that Days Inn 
was also something that added to your suspicion, can you 
tell me why? 
A Because it was showing that he stayed in a motel. 
8
 I On the lease agreement it showed that he had been, that the 
9 car was rented on the fifth, today's the sixth so that 
10 I showed me that he stayed in a motel probably in Las Vegas 
because of the Las Vegas Line magazine and that the man had 
taken the long way around, that if he had a medical 
emergency what was he doing going the wrong direction? 
Q So that Days Inn envelope intensified and 
increased your suspicions? 
A Showed me that he'd been in a motel instead of 
driving to a family emergency. 
17 Q And you saw that before you looked for the 
18 || marijuana in the trunk? 
A Yes. 
Q And did you see that Days Inn envelope before or 
after you smelled this strong odor of coffee and the weak 
odor of marijuana? 
A Before. 
Q Did you find anything else, or did anyone to your 













by couriers to disguise the smell of marijuana? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What did you find? 
A Dryer fabric softener sheets. 
Q Where did you find those? 
A Wrapped around the bundles of marijuana. 
Q That doesn!t smell like coffee. 
A Yes, sir, it did. 
Q It did? 
A Yes, it did, can you believe it? 
Q No, I can't. What kind of--
A I never smelled anything like it? 
Q What kind of fabric softener sheets were they? 
A I don't know, but they sure stunk. 
Q Were they stained? 
A No, sir, they weren't. 
Q Where they a white color? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Pink color? 
A Yes, sir, they were white. 
Q Smelled like coffee? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Then I assume you saved them? 
A Yes, sir, I did. 
Q Do you have anything with you? 
A Yes, sir, they're down in evidence. 








1 || A I don't have any on the bench with me today, no, 
sir. 
Q Before I leave here today would it be possible for 
you to show those to me? 
A Absolutely. 
Q I'm not sure that I heard you correctly near the 
end of your testimony, Trooper Haycock, in response to a 
question by Mr. Benge, were there any other conversations 
8
 that you had with Mr. Bugyik, you said something about I 
9 asked him if he was willing to cooperate. What was the rest 
10 of that sentence? 
-- A If he was willing to help us out, cooperate and 
drive this load through. 
Q Oh, okay. 
A We wanted him to go to work for us and arrest the 
people that was going to receive this marijuana. 
Q And you did that at the scene? 
A Yes, immediately after he was arrested. 
1 7 Q Was any other officer there at the time? 
18 A You know, I don't remember. 
19 Q And what was his response to that? 
A He insisted he'd been framed. He knew nothing of 
the marijuana, the whole show was not his, he didn't know 
anything about it, he couldn't help me. 
Q Did you find any other evidence of the drug 
traffic in the car? 

















1 I  Q Found a sum of money? 
2 A I'd have to look at the inventory. I don't think 
there was very much money. 
Q Did you perform a search of Mr. Bugyik's person, 
terry-type pat down search at all in this process? 
A You know, I don't believe I did. 
Q You were fairly comfortable with the fact that he 
had shorts on and t-shirt and no shoes and probably no place 
8
 to hide a gun or knife or anything like that? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q And so as far as you know he didn't have any money 
-., on his person, any wallet, any - just give me your -best 
recollection, it's not that critical. 
A He didn't have very much money with him at all. 
Q Okay. 
A That's my recollection. 






17 || A The inventory? 









Q Did you do the inventory search of the car? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did anyone get a search warrant for that car after 
it was impounded? 
A No, sir. 







1 I  any of the property that was seized in this case? 
2 A No, I have not. 
Q Have you been involved in the chain of evidence in 
this case? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q In what respect? 
A The, I was involved in the chain of evidence on 
the marijuana. 
8 Q In other words, you would have been, were you the 
9 initial link in the chain? In other words, you turned it 
10 over to the evidence custodian or did you turn it over to 
- - another police officer? 
A I took it over, I took possession of it from the 
car and I released it to the evidence custodian. 
Q Did you physically remove it from the car? 
A Yes, I did. 






 '« of it 
17 I  A Yes, I did. 
18 Q Did you take photographs with the camera that you 
19 had in your patrol vehicle? 
A With the camera? What did you--
Q Did you take those photographs at the scene? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And that was then done with the camera that you 
had in your vehicle? 

































Q Did you take photographs of the evidence in sight 
in place where you first found it? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you take photographs of the interior of the 
car? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you take photographs of the defendant? 
A That I don't know. I'd have to look at the 
photos. 
Q Are they in evidence? 
A Yeah, I have possession of those photos. 
MR. EDMONDS: Could I have about five minutes, 
Your Honor? I need to ask my client a couple of questions, 
could I do that? 
THE COURT: Are you through with him? 
MR. EDMONDS: I'm not sure, but I'll be very 
brief. 
THE COURT: You'd like a five minute recess? 
MR. EDMONDS: If I could. 
MR. BENGE: No objection to that. 
THE COURT: All right, we'll take a five minute 
recess, 
(Recess taken). 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Edmonds. 
MR. EDMONDS: I just need a few more questions 
Q BY MR. EDMONDS: Trooper Haycock, what was Mr. 







1 I  A A t-shirt. 
2 Q Short sleeve t-shirt? 
A As I recall, yes. 
Q What color was it? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Do you remember what color the shorts were? 
A No. 
Q Time of day was, I'm sorry, help me with that, 
8
 I  what time of day was this? Early in the afternoon I think. 
9 A It was at 3:05 p.m. 
10 J] Q And it was on a fairly warm day? 
A Yes. 
Q Asphalt would have been hot on bare feet? 
A Probably. 
Q You're familiar as an experienced police officer 
and having had some special training, I guess, in drug 
interdiction and searches and so forth, would the term 
reasonable articulable suspicion, have you ever heard that 
17 [J before? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q At what point in this encounter did you have what 
you thought was a reasonable suspicion? 
A I had one immediately. 
Q And that was? 
A Fear. 
Q Fear of? 



















1 | Q So, but what did you suspect based on that fear? 
2 A To be careful, watch my step. 
Q All right, if we assume that the idea about 
reasonable articulable suspicion refers to a suspicion that 
you had that you can tell us about about something unlawful 
that's going on. If we assume all of those things, what 
would you tell us that you assumed or you were suspicious 
was going on? 
8
 A As a police officer, when I've dealt with people 
9 who wanted to hurt me and tried to hurt me, one of the first 
10 things that I observed about that person is they were afraid 
-- of me, that they were scared, and they were more scared than 
other people in a similar traffic stop situation. 
Q So, the first thing that you've told us about that 
caused you suspicion, namely, this man's fear caused you to 
be suspicious that he was going to hurt you? 
A That he could, that I needed to be careful. 
1 6
 Q And you didn't have any other ideas in your head 
17 at that point about some other unlawful activities, you were 
18 I just afraid for your safety? 
A That's correct. 
Q At some point, I assume, before you turned the key 
in that trunk and found the bags of marijuana you had formed 
in your mind what we call probable cause to believe that 
there was some drugs in that car, is that fair to say? 
A Yes. 


















1 I  A At the time that I had asked him how much 
2 marijuana was in the trunk, in the car. 
Q Okay, so by the time you asked him how much 
marijuana was in the car you, at least in your mind, had 
probable cause to believe that there was marijuana in the 
car? 
A Yes. 
Q And what was that based on, Trooper? 
8
 A That was based on the points of reasonable 
9 suspicion that I address in this case. 
10 I Q Including the smell, the map, the luggage, all of 
that? 
A The map, the keys, the Days Inn, the fast foods, 
the window rolled down on the passenger side, the luggage, 
the fear, the lease agreement, the false name, the Las Vegas 
magazine. 
Q All right. I think you said earlier that it was 
1
 suspicious to you that he had been, or you had concluded 
17 that he had been to Las Vegas, is that right? 
18 A That's correct. 
1 9 I Q Help me with this, when I used to drive from Salt 
Lake City to Phoenix I would always go through Las Vegas, is 
that a roundabout route or would that in your judgment be a 
roundabout route? 
A To Phoenix? 
Q From Salt Lake City to Phoenix I would go through 


















1 I  A You could do that. 
2 Q I could do it, but would you consider that to be 
less than the direct route? 
A From Salt Lake that may be the direct route, for 
Salt Lake, but we're not talking about Salt Lake, we're 
talking about Denver. 
Q That's what I'm getting to. What would, in your 
judgment, be a more direct route for Mr. Bugyik to have 
8
 driven than the one you thought that he had taken? 
9 A Tucson to Phoenix, Phoenix to Bluff, Utah, Bluff, 
10 I Utah to Moab, Utah, Moab, Utah, to Grand Junction, Colorado, 
Grand Junction, Colorado to Denver, Colorado. 
Q And that's on--
A That's on Highway 191 and I think probably in 
Arizona I--I don't know what the interstate is in Arizona 
that you come up out of Tucson and Phoenix on up through 
Flagstaff. 
1 6
 Q Okay, there's no interstate though is there in 
17 that route? 
18 A Or four lane highway, whatever it is that comes up 
19 out of there, that's the route. He would have went east 
instead of west. 
Q One final area I'd like to talk about. The 
registration that was in the window was valid, it was 
complete, and you had determined that did you tell him that, 
did you say it's okay? 


















1 I  Q You don't recall saying that to him? 
2 A I don't recall saying that. 
Q You don't recall saying, "Gee, I was wrong, I 
shouldn't have stopped you," or, "the registration's okay." 
A I would have said that. I would have apologized 
to him. 
Q But you don't remember doing that? 
A That's because he invited me to stay before I 
8
 apologized and left. 
9 Q So the answer is, yes, you don't remember doing 
10 I that? 
A I didn't do that. 
Q Didn't you say that you were turning around to 
leave when he made that invitation? 
A Yes, I was getting ready to leave. 
Q Didn't you say you were turning around to leave? 
A Well, I was getting ready to leave, whatever 
that--in my mind I realized that I was going to have to 
1 7
 I leave. 
18 MR. EDMONDS: That's all. 
19 MR. BENGE: Just a couple matters on redirect. I 















BY MR. BENGE; 
Q With regard to the coffee smell, Trooper Haycock, 







1 I  it evident to you that that was the smell that you'd been 
2 smelling? 
A Yes. 
Q And would you describe the fabric softener smell 
and coffee in itself or how would you describe that? 
A Like these sweet coffees that are popular now 
these days, these vanilla bean coffees, I don't know, maybe 
that's a bad characterization but these sweet cappuccino 
8 coffees that are popular today. 
9 Q And that's what the fabric softener smelled like? 
10 A Yes. 
1;L Q And there's no question that was that same smell 
that--
MR. EDMONDS: I object to this. You know, I don't 
mind a little bit of leading but--
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. EDMONDS: Thank you. 
1 6
 Q BY MR. BENGE: Mr. Edmonds asked you a couple of 
17 times about the fact that you didn't search the defendant's 
18 person for weapons and just why didn't you do that? 
19 A When he approached me, on his clothing I didn't 
notice anything that caused me any alarm. And when turned 
around to get back in the car I didn't see anything that 
caused me any alarm either. 
Q Is there anything else? 
A No. 





































experience in drug interdiction, is there something about 
Tucson and or Las Vegas that would cause you alarm? 
A Yes. 
Q What is that? 
A I know that Tucson is characterized as an export 
city for marijuana as is Las Vegas. 
Q What about Denver? 
A Denver, Colorado is an import city for those 
products. And I know that 1-70 is a corridor in which those 
drugs are driven and delivered. 
MR. BENGE: That's all I have. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. EDMONDS; 
Q Based on all of that then I guess it's fair to 
assume that just about any time you make a stop on 1-70 
that's in your mind, isn't it? 
A It could be, yes. 
Q Do you have any particular thing that you're 
looking for when you make a stop and you have that in mind? 
Is there any kind of complex of characteristics or things 
that go together that raise your suspicion? 
A Well, I don't know that it's so much that you're 
looking for anything as it is that when you pull somebody 
over those things are visible and it turns lights on and 
switches that tell you I've seen this before, this has 
happened before. And when I've seen this is the result of 







1 J Q How often have you had the experience that you 
2 didn't see a license plate and you stopped the car and it 
turned out that it had a valid temporary registration--
MR. BENGE: Objection, beyond the scope of 
redirect. 
MR. EDMONDS: Well, then I move to reopen. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule the 
objection because I want to know what the answer is. 
8
 II THE WITNESS: Ask me the question. 
9 Q BY MR. EDMONDS: How often do you make that 
10 mistake? 
-- A It happens quite a few times in the course of a 
year. 
Q How often to you make that mistake and it leads to 
a drug courier? 
A You know, I don't know. 
Q Has it ever happened before? 
A Not just exactly like this it hasn't. 
17 I  Q Well, have you ever found a drug courier in a 
18 situation that began with a stop that was just like this one 
2_g in terms of you didn't see a license plate but it turned out 
that there was a valid temporary registration? 
A I don't remember, probably have but I don't 
remember. 
Q Do you know of any other officers having made such 




















1 || Q In this area? 
A Yes. 
MR. EDMONDS: That's all. 
THE COURT: I have a question and maybe you 
answered it and I just missed it. I didn't ever hear you 
explain why it is you missed the temporary sticker but you 
noticed the absence of the plate, was it the angle of the 
window or what? 
8
 II THE WITNESS: When I pulled in behind the car I 
9 didn't see it either. The window on the car is tilted back 
10 like this and so the plate is taped on it like this and so 
11 Y o u' r e' furthermore it had, and I looked at that and I 
thought why didn't I see that, and then when you go back to 
your car and look you don't see it again. But there's 
little defrosting wires that go through the back window and 
then windows were the darker tint, legal darker tint from 
the factory and you just couldn't see it. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any questions on that from 
1 7
 I either of you? 
18 I MR. EDMONDS: No. 
MR. BENGE: No. 
THE COURT: Thanks, you can step down. I take it 
you've had no other witnesses, Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: How about you, Mr. Edmonds? 
MR. EDMONDS: I'm not going to call any witnesses 



















1 I  case at this time. If the Court would permit me 10 days I 
2 would like to brief the case. There's been a couple of 
things about the evidence that came out a little differently 
than I thought they would and additionally--
THE COURT: I was going to suggest that myself. 
And let me indicate what Ifm most interested in here. I'm 
interested in whether there are cases on the initial stop 
here where as it turns out there is no problem but one might 
8
 [J concluded that what the officer did was understandable given 
9 what he saw. And I know you also have an issue with the 
10 I moving from a level II to a level I encounter here. There 
is a Utah case on that and--
MR. EDMONDS: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not thinking of that one, 
I'm thinking of the one where they asked where do we pay the 
ticket. 
MR. BENGE: Uintah Basin case. 
1 6
 MR. EDMONDS: Well, there's the other case where 
1 7 the police officer says, stops the guy on a license plate 
18 and says, "Get it fixed," and then the guy proceeds to fix 
19 it right there on the spot. And the police officer holds 
the flashlight for him while he's doing that and one thing 
leads to another, leads to another, to another, and pretty 
soon we have 100 pounds of cocaine or something. 
THE COURT: Yeah, that was the Patefield case, 
it's my case, and I think in that case it was turned on--


















1 I  the defendant in Patefield had by his own actions taken the 
2 thing from a level II back to a level I encounter. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. EDMONDS: Probably have that Patefield was 
probable cause. 
THE COURT: Yeah, it was a later step. And I'm 
pretty comfortable with II versus I here. You're welcome to 
address in your memorandum if you'd like, and then I know 
8
 you, I think, had an issue here with reasonable suspicion to 
9 extend that and to look for weapons in the car. And then 
10 I there's the question here whether there's probable cause to 
search with all of the factors. 
And by the time he actually opened the trunk there 
were a number of indicators here, and I don't know whether 
you're going to be able to find many cases that's very 
helpful on that because with a large number of factors, many 
of which are quite light indicators, you're probably not 
going to find another case that's very much on point with 
1 7 I that and it may turn very much on how it all adds up to me. 
18 I So, I'm not expecting much on that. If you get me 
a case that's on all fours I'll dance for joy. But I think 
I'm going to have to muddle that aspect through by myself if 
I get that far. 
MR. BENGE: Could I have 10 days after Mr. Edmonds 
presents this? 
THE COURT: Sure, 10 and 10. What do you want to 




















1 I  after my ruling? 
2 MR. EDMONDS: That's fine with me. I'm sorry that 
I've caused the Court the inconvenience of being in Salt 
Lake City and not being able to accommodate a date that was 
changed before. If the clerk could just call me and leave a 
message as to when we could have a telephone conference I'll 
make sure that I'm by a phone so that Mr. Benge and I and 
the clerk can work out a date. That will probably be the 
8
 I  easiest way then we won't have problems with making motions. 
9 THE COURT: Well, for a trial date we're looking 
10 I at something in probably April maybe even May by the time 
this is resolved so it may be less of a problem. Mr. 
Bugyik, I want to make sure you understand that it hasn't 
been resolved here today whether there will have to be a 
trial or not, but it is not our responsibility, that is 
mine, to make sure that you find out about the trial date if 
there is going to be a trial, it's your responsibility to 
find out about that. So if you haven't heard from your 
1 7 attorney in the next 3 0 days you call him and you keep 
18 calling until you get a hold of him and you get an answer 
i g about that. And if he doesn't have an answer 3 0 days from 
now you call him 30 days later. It's your responsibility to 
find out what's happening as far as getting a trial date in 
this case, okay? Do you accept that responsibility? 
MR. BUGYIK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, Counsel? 













MR. BENGE: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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ADDENDUM B 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
Grand County, Utah 
FILED NOV 2 6 1997 ^{J 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STEVEN DIETER BUGYIK, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 9717-44 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
The suppression hearing in this case was held on 
September 30, 1997. Following the hearing, counsel offered to 
submit memoranda on the legal issues. Counsel thereafter agreed 
to supplement the record by including the fabric softener sheets 
about which Trooper Richard Haycock ("Haycock") testified. The 
Court has now received memoranda from both parties. 
Initial Stop 
Defendant contends that Haycock should not have stopped 
defendant's vehicle. Haycock's uncontradicted testimony 
established that the temporary permit sticker in the rear window 
of defendant's vehicle was not visible. Since Haycock could see 
no license plate or temporary registration sticker as he 
approached the vehicle from behind, he had a reasonable suspicion 
that defendant was driving a vehicle without registration. The 
1 
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Court is convinced that the combination of tint, slant and 
defroster element lines in the rear window made the sticker 
invisible to Haycock. 
Since an officer is permitted to stop any vehicle when 
he observes a violation of the traffic laws, Haycock's decision 
to stop defendant's vehicle did not violate defendant's constitu-
tional rights. The Court believes that Haycock was close enough 
to the rear of the vehicle to observe the great majority of 
temporary stickers. The invisibility of this sticker resulted 
entirely from defendant's choices. The Court rejects defendant's 
suggestion that officers must be required to drive alongside 
every vehicle without license plates or a visible temporary 
sticker before effecting a traffic stop. 
Citizen-Police Encounter 
Once Haycock got out of his car and approached 
defendant on foot, he noticed the valid temporary sticker in the 
rear window of defendant's vehicle. He then did precisely what 
the law requires; he notified defendant of the reason for the 
stop, noted that his concern had been allayed, and turned to 
leave. At this point, the level two encounter ended. 
Defendant then invited Haycock to examine his rental 
agreement. The encounter then became a level one citizen-police 
encounter, just as if Haycock had walked up to defendant on the 
2 
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street or knocked on his door. The facts of this case are 
indistinguishable from State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 
1992) . While it may appear inconceivable in hindsight that 
defendant invited continued police attention, Castner is evidence 
that such events do occur. Defendant may have concluded that he 
was more likely to allay any police suspicion by appearing 
exceptionally cooperative. 
Weapons Search 
The Court agrees with defendant that, by the time 
Haycock searched the passenger compartment for weapons, the 
encounter had risen again to a level two encounter. If it were 
still a level one encounter and Haycock suspected he was in 
danger, his only remedy would be to remove himself from the 
situation. The Court must accordingly determine whether, at the 
time Haycock searched the passenger compartment, he had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. 
By the time Haycock searched the passenger compartment 
for weapons, he had observed the following: 
1. Defendants luggage was in the passenger 
compartment, not the trunk. 
2. Defendant was more anxious than the average 
citizen, and his anxiety appeared to increase, rather than 
3 
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decrease, with the passage of time. He was unable to focus on 
putting on his shoes long enough to get both of them on. 
3. Defendant was not an authorized driver of the 
vehicle, which had been rented by Dean Porter. 
A. Defendant claimed that the vehicle had been rented 
for him by Dr. Dean Allen. 
5. Defendant had an open road map on the front seat. 
6. The key ring had more keys than would be expected 
with a normal rental car. 
7. Fast food wrappers littered the interior of the 
vehicle. 
8. Defendant claimed to be travelling from Tucson to 
Denver on a family medical emergency. 
9. A magazine and a motel envelope suggested that the 
vehicle had been in Las Vegas. 
10. Travelling from Tucson to Denver by way of Las 
Vegas would be a very substantial detour, particularly for one 
responding to a family medical emergency. 
11. Defendant's clothing could not conceal much of a 
weapon. 
12. Defendant's Arizona license was not valid. 
13. Defendant was travelling on a drug courier route 
from an area that exports marijuana to an area that imports it. 
4 
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Some of the indicators noted by Haycock are clearly 
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion and carry little 
weight even when considered with other factors. For example, an 
open road map is not uncommon for interstate travellers, nor is 
an untidy vehicle interior. However, all of the factors taken 
together reasonably justify a suspicion that 1) defendant may not 
have authorization to possess or drive the vehicle, and 2) 
defendant was not doing what he claimed to be doing. Defendant 
was also apparently driving without a valid license. Haycock was 
justified in determining that this situation warranted further 
inquiry. Defendant's agitated state and apparent deceptiveness, 
coupled with the remote location and the lack of immediate back-
up, created a reasonable concern for officer safety. Haycock was 
therefore entitled to make a protective sweep of the passenger 
compartment before proceeding with the inquiry. 
Search of the Trunk 
Haycock's subsequent search of the trunk of defendant's 
vehicle must be justified by probable cause. In addition to the 
factors set forth in the foregoing section, Haycock knew the 
following by the time he decided to search the trunk: 
1. He smelled a weak odor of marijuana and a strong 
odor of coffee in the passenger compartment, but saw no coffee. 
5 
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Haycock had learned that coffee odors can by used to mask 
marijuana odors.1 
2. Defendant had stated that he did not know what was 
in the trunk. 
Even the weak smell of marijuana, standing alone, is 
sufficient to justify a search. Exigent circumstances are 
evident from the lack of backup, the remote location, and the 
time required to obtain a warrant. The search of the trunk was 
accordingly proper. 
Conclusion 
The motion to suppress is denied. Defendant is ordered 
to appear before the Court with his counsel on December 17, 1997, 
at 9:30 a.m. for trial setting. 
DATED this 2 6th day of November, 1997. 
</> 
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Xs *^4 •-- -'i=u--\ / H Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge 
1
 The Court has accepted defendant's invitation to smell the fabric softener sheets that 
surrounded the marijuana to see if they smell like coffee. This judge has had little 
experience with fabric softener, and less with coffee. The judge also has a poorly trained 
olfactory sense, the performance of which is currently diminished by the viruses of the 
season. The experience was not helpful to the Court's analysis. 
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